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Abstract 
This article aims to examine the existence of rule manipulation and moral hazard in the Brazilian Unemployment 
Insurance Program. For empirical analysis, the rule manipulation test by Cattaneo, Janson and Ma (2016) was used, as 
well as fuzzy and sharp regression discontinuity. The data was built using data from the National Employment and 
Unemployment Survey from January 2008 to June 2014 due to the greater homogeneity of the rules for benefit access. 
Based on the results, the program is an influence on the length of employment of Brazilian workers given the existence 
of rule manipulation, assessed by the length of stay in the last job. Furthermore, it was found that heads of families and 
their children were less likely to search for employment. This findings were corroborated when data from the program 
beneficiaries only was assessed, showing a lower job search probability, between -21.80 p.p. and -15.08 p.p. for the 
children, and between -39.40 p.p. and -28.50 p.p. for the heads of families. Thus, it is possible to confirm the existence 
of both rule manipulation the access of the program, as well as moral hazard, which points to the need to restructure the 
program, and above all, have less influence on the national labor market. 
Keywords: rule manipulation, moral hazard, Unemployment Insurance Program 
1. Introduction 
There is a consensus that the Unemployment Insurance Program – UIP is very important for the Brazilian Social 
Security. However, with evidence of rule manipulation in the program, it is important that changes are made to reduce 
its influence on the labor market and increase its allocative efficiency. Therefore, the present article aims to examine the 
existence of rule manipulation and moral hazard in the Brazilian Unemployment Insurance Program. For the empirical 
analysis, the rule manipulation test by Cattaneo, Janson and Ma (2016a) was used, as well as fuzzy and sharp regression 
discontinuity. 
To measure the presence of moral hazard in the Brazilian UIP, Fuzzy and Sharp Regression Discontinuity Designs – RD 
were used, as well as the rule manipulation test indicated by Cattaneo Janson and Ma (2016), a sophistication of the test 
proposed by McCrary (2008)i. The Employment and Unemployment Survey (Pesquisa de Emprego e Desemprego-PED) 
database was used from January 2008 to June 2014, given the homogeneity of the rule that gives access to the benefit. 
The results found indicate the existence of the manipulation of the rule that gives access to the UIP, and that the benefit 
negatively influences the job search time by workers considered as the heads of families and those considered children 
within the families. 
In Brazil, the structural importance of the UIP and its impacts on the beneficiaries has been emphasized by authors such 
as Chahad (1984, 1999a, 1999b, 2000), Amadeo and Camargo (1995), Balbinotto Neto and Zylberztajn (1999, 2002), 
Barros, Corseuil and Foguel (2000), Chahad and Fernandes (2002), Ambrózio (2003), Andrade, Leite and Ramos 
(2010), Carvalho (2010), Hijzen (2011), Gerard and Gonzaga (2012), and Teixeira and Balbinotto Neto (2013, 2016). 
These authors point out that, from the worker point of view, the Brazilian UIP functions as a temporary source of 
income following involuntary dismissal, allowing the unemployed worker to be more selective in the choice of his/her 
next employment. On the other hand, the authors particularly criticize the standardization of benefit distribution, the 
lack of professional qualifications, and the incentive for turnover in the Brazilian labor marketii. 
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This study advances in the methodology to be used in evaluating the existence of moral hazard in the program; it also 
opens new horizons in the assessment analysis of the Unemployment Insurance Program, through the effect it exerts on 
the turnover in the labor market. This aspect is important since one of the issues in the Brazilian economy is low worker 
productivity, and a reason given by the national companies is the low motivation to invest in human capital which 
occurs, among other aspects, due to incentives for employee dismissal exercised by the Government Severance 
Indemnity Fund for Employees and by the Unemployment Insurance Program, as emphasized by (Shavell e Weiss, 1979; 
Chahad, 2000; Hopenhayn e Nicolini,1997 e 2002; Camargo, 2004; Pavoni, 2006). 
The findings are corroborated when data from only the program’s beneficiaries only is assessed, where a lower job 
search probability was observed, between -21.80 p.p. and -15.08 p.p. for the children, and -39.40 p.p. and -28.50 p.p. for 
the heads of families. Thus, it is possible to confirm the existence of both rule manipulation to the access of the program, 
as well as moral hazard, which points to the need to restructure the program, and above all, have less influence on the 
national labor market. 
In addition to this introduction, the article comprises four more sections; the second section is a literature review of the 
influence of UIP on the labor market at an international and national level; the third section focuses on the empirical 
strategy and the development of the database; in the fourth section, the results are analyzed; and, finally, in the fifth 
section, the final considerations are discussed. 
2. Empirical Review 
Due to space limitations, as well as a vast literature regarding the effects of UIP on the labor market, only data from the 
late 1990s onward is shown. Empirical studies in Brazil have also increased since that decade. 
Card et al. (2007) explored the discontinuity of the relationship between the length of stay in the last job and entitlement 
to the benefit in the Austrian UIP. Under the program’s legislation, workers who were employed for less than 36 months 
in the last 5 years could be eligible to a 20-week benefit when dismissed, whereas those who were employed for 36 
months or more could receive a 30-week benefit. With a sample of workers aged between 20 and 50, the authors found 
that the workers eligible for the 30-week benefit searched for a new job 5% to 9% less in the first 20 weeks than those 
eligible for the 20-week benefit. 
In Finland, January 2003, the Unemployment Insurance benefit was extended to workers with a long-term history of 
employment; the system of indemnity for length of employment was abolished as well. The average benefit had a 15% 
increase in the first 150 days of unemployment. Uusitalo and Verho (2010) used this change in policy to evaluate the 
impact of the benefit on the unemployment duration rate and found that such a structural change to the benefit reduced 
the unemployment duration rate by an average of 17%. According to the authors, this effect was identified mainly for 
the workers who were in the first months of the benefit and tends to disappear with the length of time in the program. 
Lalive (2007) used the method of regression discontinuity to assess the impact of the increase in the number of 
payments by the Austrian UIP, when the coverage changed from 32 to 54 weeks for workers younger than 50 years old 
and 32 to 209 weeks, in some regions, for the other workers. The results found by the author indicate that the increase in 
the number of payments by the program promoted an increase in unemployment duration, the probability of finding a 
job did not increase, and the regular job transition was reduced, particularly for women older than 50 years of age. As a 
matter of fact, the program ended up stimulating a rise in the transition period between one job and another for the 
beneficiaries.  
Schmieder et al. (2012) assessed the impact of the German UIP using regression discontinuity, with a focus on the 
benefited workers aged between 40 and 49 from July 1987 to March 1999, when the program was created. The results 
showed that for each month of the benefit the unemployment duration increased on average from 0.10 to 0.13 monthsiii. 
With regard to the Brazilian UIP, the studies of Cunningham (1997), based on the models of differences in differences, 
stand out for trying to identify if the increase in the number of payments by the Brazilian UIP created in 1995, affected 
the possibility of the beneficiaries return to the labor market with a higher salary or if they would be more likely to 
re-enter in the informal labor market. The results found by the author suggest that the changes in the program did not 
induce reemployment with higher salaries in the formal labor market, nor was there significant change to the workers 
migrating from the formal to the informal market due to the expansion of the benefit. 
Margolis (2008) used simulations to examine the effect of UIP and the amount paid by the Government Severance 
Indemnity Fund for Employees on the reintegration rates of beneficiaries from the formal sector in relation to those 
unemployed from the informal sector. According to the author, both the government severance indemnity and 
unemployment insurance accelerate the transition rate from one formal job to another. In addition, the author indicates 
that the program may be reducing the intensity of searching for employment in the informal sector. 
Moreover, Zylberstajn and Ribeiro (2010) used different specifications of logistic regressions and a monthly job survey 
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to measure the impact of the UIP on the probabilities of job dismissal. According to the authors, the benefit affects, 
more significantly, the risk of job loss for married women, as well as single men with a lower income. 
Robalino et al. (2011), using a job search model and a rotating panel design as a theoretical basis, found that the 
workers who were registered in the program had a higher probability of getting more job offers from the formal sector. 
Moreover, the saving effect generated by the program, had the greatest impact among the less qualified workers and 
women. The authors also simulated a rise in the worker’s contribution to the program which generated a higher level of 
formal unemployment in the economy. 
Hijzen (2011), based on an econometric instrument of regression differences, evaluated the impact of the Brazilian UIP 
on unemployment duration and on the moral hazard related to informal work while receiving the benefit. Analyzing the 
results found by the author, it is possible to identify the increase in both unemployment duration and incentive for 
informal work generated by the Brazilian UIP. 
Gerard and Gonzaga (2012) used an econometric instrument based on regression discontinuity to estimate the effect of 
an extension of UIP payments on the search for employment as well as on the Brazilian labor market. The authors used 
the monthly job survey from 2003 to 2010 and RAIS data. One of the main results found by the authors was that with 
the expansion of the insurance coverage from three to five payments at most, there was a 50% decrease in the 
percentage of reemployment in the informal sector, and also that the moral hazard was reduced with the completion of 
the benefit. 
Teixeira and Balbinotto Neto (2013, 2016) pointed out that the program does not have any influence on the beneficiaries’ 
reemployment income, controlled by the length of stay in the last job. This result was obtained based on sharp 
discontinuity regression, as well as by the propensity score matching, based on the Brazil’s National Sample Household 
Survey (PNAD) data for the years 2006 to 2009. In addition, the authors also used sharp discontinuity regression to 
analyze data only from the Brazilian Employment and Unemployment Survey from 2008 to 2012 and found that the 
program had a negative influence on the search for new jobs by both heads of families and children. 
However, gaps are yet to be filled regarding the program, such as its effect on the length of employment for Brazilian 
workers, as well as on the probability of seeking employment while receiving the benefit, with little explored 
instruments, such as fuzzy discontinuity regression, which allows greater flexibility around the discontinuity point. 
These subjects will be highlighted next. 
3. Indicators, Data, Manipulation Test and Discontinuity Regression 
3.1 Indicator and Data 
The analysis proposed uses data from the National Employment and Unemployment Survey (PED) by the Inter-Union 
Department of Statistics (DIEESE), from 2008 to 2014. This employment and unemployment survey refers to the 
metropolitan areas of the capital cities Fortaleza, Recife, Salvador, Belo Horizonte, São Paulo, Porto Alegre, and 
Brasília. The number of workers studied was 91,797, of which 8,024 were beneficiaries (treated group) and the others 
non-beneficiaries (control group). The data was grouped by year and the database was built with the following filters: (i) 
at the time of the survey workers were in an open unemployment situation, with no links to formal or informal work and 
not searching for a new job; (ii) workers had a signed employee’s record book for the last job; (iii) workers had been 
dismissed without just cause from their last job; and (iv) the length of stay in the last job was greater than zero. 
The first filter was used precisely because in order to have access to the benefit, the worker must be unemployed, that is, 
without any formal work links. The second concerns an important point which is to have worked formally in the last job, 
otherwise workers are not entitled to claim the benefit. The third is also a rule that defines the access to the benefit, 
since only workers dismissed without just cause are entitled to claim the benefit. Finally, the fourth filter is the tool that 
will be used to determine whether workers had access to the Unemployment Insurance Program. 
The fourth filter has an important role in the analysis as this will simulate the experiment given that a worker will be 
registered as a claimant of the benefit or not according to the length of stay in the last job. However, since not everyone 
who is entitled to the benefit will claim it, for reasons that range from not meeting the minimum interval between one 
application and another for the benefit, to not using it due to the low value of the payment, the methodology based on a 
fuzzy regression discontinuity will be used firstly, followed by a sharp regression discontinuity. The descriptive 
statistics of the database are highlighted in table 1. 
Table 1 shows that the majority of workers who were dismissed from their jobs in the period from 2008 to 2014 
remained, at most, 12 months in their last job (60.59%) and this percentage is still higher among those considered 
children (69.08%), which reinforces the fact that young workers are the ones with the greatest incentive to change jobs 
in Brazil. Next, the total number of benefited and non-benefited workers is highlighted, and the beneficiaries are 
segmented by Unemployment Insurance payments (Table 2). 
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Table 1. Family position and length of time in the last job 
Time in the last job 
(months) 
Total Head of Family Partner Child 
Abs % Abs % Abs % Abs % 
1-3 21,967 23.93 4,035 17.81 4,909 21.08 13023 28.39 
4-6 13,936 15.25 2,774 12.25 3,156 13.55 8006 17.48 
7-9 7,888 8.66 1,845 8.14 1,869 8.02 4174 9.16 
10-12  11,705 12.75 2,444 10.79 2,824 12.13 6437 14.05 
13-15 2,756 3.06 792 1.32 658 2.82 1306 2.89 
16-18 4,266 4.66 1,109 4.89 1088 4.67 2069 4.59 
19-21 1,616 1.76 444 1.96 451 1.93 721 1.59 
22-24  7,838 8.54 1,859 8.21 2131 9.16 3848 8.39 
25 or more 19,631 21.39 7,293 32.21 6151 26.42 6187 13.49 
Total 91,767 100 22,644 100 23279 100 4874 100 
Source: National Employment and Unemployment Survey (2008-2014). 
 
Table 2. Non-beneficiaries and beneficiaries by payments 
Payments 
Total Head of Family Partner Child 
Abs % Abs % Abs % Abs % 
0 83773 91.26 19126 84.46 21903 94.09 42744 93.18 
1 2242 2.44 956 4.22 359 1.54 927 2.02 
2 1870 2.04 822 3.63 294 1.26 754 1.64 
3 1627 1.77 719 3.18 284 1.22 624 1.36 
4 1441 1.57 628 2.77 277 1.19 536 1.17 
5* 844 0.92 393 1.74 162 0.70 289 0.63 
Total 91797 100 22644 100 23279 100 45874 100 
Source: National Employment and Unemployment Survey (2008-2014). *Due to the low number of workers observed 
in the sixth and seventh payment, they were grouped into the fifth payment. 
 
Table 2 shows that the proportion of beneficiaries represents about 8% of the sample, with a higher proportion of 
children (49.97%), followed by partners (25.35%) and heads of families (24.68%). However, among the latter, the 
greatest number of beneficiaries is about 13.54%, and most of them in the first three payments. Thus, the database can 
be characterized mostly by non-beneficiaries and children in the family position; for this reason, the analysis will be 
segmented into family positions, given the different proportions in the sample, as well as the responsibilities within the 
family. In the following section, the possibility of rule manipulation by the beneficiaries will be analyzed based on the 
test developed by Cattaneo, Janson and Ma (2016). 
3.2 Manipulation Test and Discontinuity Regression  
The rule manipulation analysis, based on Cattaneo, Janson and Ma (2016), defines that for a given sample, the random 
variable *𝑋𝑖: 𝑖 = 1,2… , 𝑛+ has a cumulative distribution function (c.d.f) and a probability density function (p.d.f) given 
respectively by F(x) and f(x). Each unit will be treated or control from a cutoff value of X denoted by c= 6 months in the 
last job. So, groups can be: 
 
Individual i will be from the control group if 𝑋𝑖 < (𝑐 = 6 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑕𝑠 ) 
Individual i will be from the treatment group if 𝑋𝑖 ≥ (𝑐 = 6 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑕𝑠) 
 
In the case under analysis, the variable 𝑋𝑖  to be tested is the length of stay in the last job and i is the worker who is in the 
situation of open unemployment, that is, searching for a job and without any work links. The manipulation test evaluates 
the continuity hypothesis of the density function f(.) around the point c (cutoff). Formally, the following hypotheses are 
tested: 
𝐻0 = lim
𝑥↑𝑐
𝑓(𝑥) = lim
𝑥↓𝑐
𝑓(𝑥)           𝑣𝑠        𝐻1 = lim
𝑥↓𝑐
𝑓(𝑥) ≠ lim
𝑥↑𝑐
𝑓(𝑥) 
In the construction of the test, we use the estimation of a density function 𝑓(𝑥) based on a local polynomial from the 
cumulative distribution function (c.d.f) of the sample. This estimator has several interesting features, including the fact 
that it does not need a predefined functional form and it is implemented quite intuitively. In addition, the estimator also 
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allows incorporating constraints on (c.d.f) and allows higher order derivatives in the density function, providing the test 
with a greater power of properties and implicationsiv. The statistical implementation of the test is performed as follows: 
 
𝑇𝑝(𝑕𝑛) =
?̂?+,𝑝(𝑕𝑛)−?̂?−,𝑝(𝑕𝑛)
?̂?𝑝(𝑕𝑛)
,     ?̂?𝑝
2(𝑕𝑛) = ?̂?,𝑓+,𝑝(𝑕𝑛) − 𝑓−,𝑝(𝑕𝑛)-              (1) 
 
where 𝑇𝑝(𝑕𝑛) is the critical value calculated in the test, based on the differences of the distributions estimated from the 
local polynomials of the values before and after the cutoff, and ?̂?𝑝(𝑕𝑛) is the standard deviation estimator of the 
difference between distributions. 
 
 
Figure 1. Kernel Density of the length of stay in the last job 
Source: National Employment and Unemployment Survey (2008-2014). 
 
Figure 1 shows that there is strong evidence that the distributions of length of stay in the last job concentrate around six 
months (red vertical line), which is the necessary time to be eligible for the program. This indicates the presence of rule 
manipulation; however, it is still a preliminary and not very robust result. Next, the formalization of regression 
discontinuity is discussed, a methodology that will be used to evaluate the presence of moral hazard. 
The main virtue of using regression discontinuity instruments is that they explore arbitrary rules that determine the 
treatment, thus generating natural experiments. Therefore, based on the discontinuity point, the treatment is locally 
random, enabling the estimation of the treatment mid effect without the problem of selection bias. However, the limitation 
of the method is directly associated with the cutoff distance and the randomness of the variable to be used as an instrument 
(LEE AND LEMIEUX, 2010). 
According to Lee (2008), when the treatment variable is fully defined by 𝑥𝑖, the sharp regression discontinuity can be 
applied. Conversely, when the treatment variable is determined by 𝑥𝑖, but with some residue, then the fuzzy regression 
discontinuity should be used. In practice, a sharp regression discontinuity is rarely observed, since access to the treatment 
is defined by many aspects and cannot always be captured entirely. 
However, for this case the selection on observables is given by 𝑥 −̃  , 𝑥 is the length of stay in the last job, and   is the 
time required to apply for the benefit, if the propensity score  ( |𝑥) has any breaks around   , and if  𝑖𝑚𝑥     (𝑢𝑗|𝑥) =
 , then the fuzzy regression discontinuity can be applied. 
The main difference between fuzzy and sharp regression discontinuity is that  ( |𝑥) has a break in 𝑥 =  , but with 
unknown magnitude. 
 
 𝑖𝑚𝑥↓    ( |𝑥) −  𝑖𝑚𝑥↑    ( |𝑥)  ≠                                   (2) 
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Therefore, the characterization of the treatment effect on the subpopulation 𝑥 −̃   in the fuzzy regression discontinuity 
can be seen in the following model: 
 
 𝑖𝑚𝑥↑  (𝑦|𝑥) = 𝛽𝑑 𝑖𝑚𝑥↑  ( |𝑥) +  𝑖𝑚𝑥↑  𝑔(𝑥) +  𝑖𝑚𝑥↑  (𝑢|𝑥)                    (3) 
 
and 
 
 𝑖𝑚𝑥↓  (𝑦|𝑥) = 𝛽𝑑 𝑖𝑚𝑥↓  ( |𝑥) +  𝑖𝑚𝑥↓  𝑔(𝑥) +  𝑖𝑚𝑥↓  (𝑢|𝑥)                   (4) 
 
=>  𝑖𝑚𝑥↑  (𝑦|𝑥) −  𝑖𝑚𝑥↓  (𝑦|𝑥) = 𝛽𝑑, 𝑖𝑚𝑥↑  ( |𝑥) −  𝑖𝑚𝑥↓  ( |𝑥)-                (5) 
 
𝛽𝑑 =
𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑥↑𝜏𝐸(𝑦|𝑥)−𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑥↓𝜏𝐸(𝑦|𝑥)
𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑥↑𝜏𝐸(𝑑|𝑥)−𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑥↓𝜏𝐸(𝑑|𝑥)
                                        (6) 
 
Note that  𝑖𝑚𝑥   (𝑢|𝑥) =  . Where 𝛽𝑑 is seen as the ratio between the differences, and the denominator is equal to one, 
this is a case of sharp regression discontinuity, otherwise it is the fuzzy design. 
In a more instructive way, 𝛽𝑑 can be represented as: 
𝛽𝑑 =
𝑇𝑕𝑒 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑜𝑓  𝑥 𝑜𝑛 𝑦 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑥=  
𝑡𝑕𝑒 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑥 𝑜𝑛 𝑑 𝑤𝑕𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑥=  
                                   (7) 
The direct effect refers to  𝑖𝑚𝑥↑  𝑔(𝑥) −  𝑖𝑚𝑥↓  𝑔(𝑥) which is zero given 𝑥 =  . Then the local effect becomes the 
indirect effect of x on y from the relation of 𝑥    𝑦, which is the effect produced by x (time in last job) on d 
(program access) and the effect of d on y (job search in the last week). In the structural Sharp model, with a pth-order 
polynomial, the estimates can be represented by: 
 𝑖 = +𝛽1𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑥𝑖
2 + + 𝛽𝑝𝑥𝑖
𝑝 +   𝑖 +  𝑖                          (8) 
where again,  𝑖 = 1(𝑥𝑖 ≥ 𝑐) is discontinuous in 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑐 and   is the local effect the unemployment insurance benefits 
about job search in the last week. 
When exploits discontinuities in the probability of treatment conditional on 𝑥𝑖, we use a Rd Fuzzy, in two stage. The 
first stage in this case is: 
 𝑖 =  0 +  1𝑥𝑖 +  2𝑥𝑖
2 + +  𝑝𝑥𝑖
𝑝 +  𝑇𝑖 +  1𝑖                       (9) 
where   is the first-stage effect to 𝑇𝑖. 
The Fuzzy Rd is obtained by substituting (8) into (9): 
 𝑖 =  +  1𝑥𝑖 +  2𝑥𝑖
2 + +  𝑝𝑥𝑖
𝑝 +   𝑇𝑖 +  2𝑖                       (10) 
where  = +  0 and  𝑗 = 𝛽𝑗 +   𝑖 for j=1,…, p. In this case, the local UIP effect about job search in the last week is 
   when 𝑇𝑖 = 1(𝑥𝑖 ≥ 𝑐). 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
The table 3 highlights the estimated levels of the "T" statistic, which indicates whether rule manipulation exists based on 
the instrument defined as length of stay in the last job. The null hypothesis of the test indicates that there is no 
manipulation, since the alternative indicates the existence of manipulation, as defined by Cattaneo, Janson and Ma (2016), 
based on the rddensity algorithm and six-month cutoff windows. 
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Table 3. Analysis of rule manipulation 
                                   Windows in months 
Family position Tests <=0.8 <=1 <= 1.5 <= 2 <=2.5 
Head of family 
Conventional 
32.8169*** 
(0.000) 
28.9022*** 
(0.000) 
29.1577*** 
(0.000) 
29.0102*** 
(0.000) 
29.0501*** 
(0.000) 
Undersmoothed 
32.6611*** 
(0.000) 
30.2498*** 
(0.000) 
30.8329*** 
(0.000) 
30.3408*** 
(0.000) 
30.4018*** 
(0.000) 
Robust 
32.8082*** 
(0.000) 
34.5283*** 
(0.000) 
33.5696*** 
(0.000) 
34.0103*** 
(0.000) 
33.8428*** 
(0.000) 
Partner 
Conventional 
30.2703*** 
(0.000) 
33.1359*** 
(0.000) 
33.1749*** 
(0.000) 
33.0881*** 
(0.000) 
33.0796*** 
(0.000) 
Undersmoothed 
-0.7339 
(0.4630) 
-0.7339 
(0.4630) 
-0.7339 
(0,4630) 
-0.7339 
(0.4630) 
-0.7339 
(0.4630) 
Robust 
6.6573*** 
(0.000) 
14.7297*** 
(0.000) 
14.7297*** 
(0.0000) 
14.7297*** 
(0.000) 
14.7297*** 
(0.000) 
Child 
Conventional 
56.5497*** 
(0.000) 
56.5420*** 
(0.000) 
56.5491*** 
(0.000) 
56.5493*** 
(0.000) 
56.5539*** 
(0.000) 
Undersmoothed 
56.5678*** 
(0.000) 
56.5704*** 
(0.000) 
56.5579*** 
(0.000) 
56.5579*** 
(0.000) 
56.5712*** 
(0.000) 
Robust 
56.0928*** 
(0.000) 
56.3893*** 
(0.000) 
56.4951*** 
(0.000) 
56.4930*** 
(0.000) 
56.4566*** 
(0.000) 
Source: Research results. 
 
The results of the “T” statistics show the presence of manipulation in the rule that gives access to the UIP to the three 
positions analyzed in the family and in five different time windows within the six months. The closer the window is to 
zero, the greater the proximity of the distributions observed around the cutoff point, which is six months. The results 
indicate that there is no randomness around the cutoff point, that is, the length of stay in the last job is manipulated 
based on the time required to access the benefit. This result supports the fact that the UIP promotes turnover in the labor 
market, with implications for investment in human capital and consequently, the low productivity of the Brazilian 
worker, as indicated by Camargo (2004). 
What follows in table 4 is an analysis of the effect of receiving the benefit on the probability of job seeking by the 
workers who are in an open unemployment situation. Since there is evidence on the manipulation of the rule that gives 
access to the benefit, as shown in table 3, , it was decided that the test would be done with different windows of length 
of stay in the last job and with a first-degree polynomial.v 
 
Table 4. Probability of searching for employment non-parametric fuzzy regression  
Payment Position 
Intervals with cutoff = 6 months (180 days) 
0.5 1.0 1.5 
β/1° β/2° β/1° β/2° β/1° β/2° 
1st 
Head 
n=6192 
0.031* 
(0.004) 
1.213 
(13.257) 
0.027* 
(0.004) 
-2.245* 
(1.119) 
0.0196* 
(0.0568) 
-3.233* 
(1.998) 
Partner 
n=6244 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.988 
(22.118) 
0.004* 
(0.002) 
-3.995 
(4.991) 
0.004* 
(0.002) 
-3.789 
(5.415) 
Child 
n=15905 
0.008 
(0.002) 
-3.444 
(3.493) 
0.008* 
(0.002) 
-3.444 
(3.493) 
0.015* 
(0.002) 
-2.700* 
(0.875) 
2nd 
Head 
n=6166 
0.020* 
(0.003) 
1.687 
(10.908) 
0.022* 
(0.005) 
-2.740* 
(1.355) 
0.014* 
(0.005) 
-4.521 
(2.922) 
Partner 
n=6238 
0.0004 
(0.003) 
4.816 
(33.114) 
0.004 
(0.002) 
-3.942 
(4.830) 
0.004* 
(0.002) 
-3.721 
(5.209) 
Child 
n=15849 
-0.102 
(0.117) 
2.040 
(3.723) 
0.011* 
(0.001) 
-3.742* 
(1.209) 
0.011* 
(0.001) 
-3.911* 
(1.248) 
3rd 
Head 
n=6157 
0.025 
(0.003) 
1.496 
(16.662) 
0.019* 
(0.004) 
-3.398* 
(1.743) 
0.017* 
(0.004) 
-3.889 
(2.366) 
Partner 
n=6236 
0.003 
(0.002) 
1.938 
(10.099) 
0.005* 
(0.002) 
-2.865 
(3.698) 
0.005* 
(0,002) 
-2.612 
(3.845) 
Child 
n=15867 
0.009* 
(0.001) 
-3.749 
(2.533) 
0.009* 
(0.001) 
-4.454* 
(1.503) 
0.009* 
(0.001) 
-4.603* 
(1.536) 
4th 
Head 
n=6127 
0.014 
(0.002) 
2.824 
(29.494) 
0.014* 
(0.002) 
0.006 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
-1.6824 
(2.6114) 
Partner 
n= 6218 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.773 
(7.673) 
0.0006 
(0.002) 
-2.722 
(10.891) 
0.0003 
(0.002) 
-4.373 
(32.049) 
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Child 
n=15795 
0.002* 
(0.0007) 
-1.378 
(10.678) 
0.002* 
(0.0009) 
-1.970* 
(1.019) 
0.002* 
(0.0009) 
-2.166* 
(1.178) 
5th 
Head 
n=6068 
0.004* 
(0.001) 
8.040 
(9.420) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
-1.831 
(1.343) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
-1.893 
(1.543) 
Partner 
n=6199 
0.001* 
(0.0009) 
3.3199 
(22.438) 
0.002* 
(0.0008) 
-7.182 
(9.071) 
0.0002 
(0.0008) 
-6.542 
(9.408) 
Child 
n=15753 
0.002* 
(0.0007) 
-12.356 
(9.423) 
0.0003 
(0.0008) 
-11.113 
(24.622) 
0.0002 
(0.0008) 
-2.014 
(7.942) 
Source: Research results from National Employment and Unemployment Survey data. Significance p≤0.1 *.  
 
Although evidence of rule manipulation indicates non-randomness at around six months, estimates were still made with 
three intervals of 3 months, 6 months and 12 months of difference in relation to the cutoff, as a way to identify some 
patterns regarding the search for employment by the workers under analysis. The results show that the length of stay in 
the job is a significant tool to indicate receipt of the unemployment insurance and that workers considered heads of 
families and children who were receiving the benefit showed lower probabilities of searching for a job in the previous 
week than workers in the same category who were not. However, as a way of adding robustness to these studies, other 
analyses were carried out with small changes in the cutoff, in order to reduce the effect of non-randomness indicated by 
the rule manipulation tests. Table 5 shows the analysis when the time required for the worker to be considered for the 
benefit was five months in the last job. 
 
Table 5. Search for employment non-parametric fuzzy regressionvi 
Payment Position Intervals with cutoff = 5 months (150 days) 
0.5 1.0 1.5 
β/1° β/2° β/1° β/2° β/1° β/2° 
1st 
Head 
n=6192 
0.007 
(0.009) 
-8.2615 
(13.504) 
0.016* 
(0.005) 
-4.312* 
(2.216) 
0.009 
(0.007) 
-6.394 
(6.886) 
Partner 
n=6244 
-0.0005 
(0.003) 
-2.431 
(3.875) 
-0.0005 
(0.002) 
4.822 
(19.608) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
2.747 
(6.740) 
Child 
n=15905 
-0.0004 
(0.003) 
3.471 
(4.122) 
0.009* 
(0.002) 
-4.957* 
(1.954) 
0.012* 
(0.002) 
-3.043* 
(1.232) 
2nd 
Head 
n=6166 
-0.018* 
(0.009) 
3.515 
(3.086) 
0.011* 
(0.005) 
-5.975* 
(3.550) 
-0.005 
(0.007) 
10.802 
(15.102) 
Partner 
n=6238 
-0.003* 
(0.0003) 
-2.971 
(5.066) 
0.0004 
(0.002) 
-4.779 
(5.032) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
5.470 
(16.033) 
Child 
n=15849 
0.007* 
(0.003) 
-2.904 
(3.686) 
0.009* 
(0.001) 
-4.997* 
(1.741) 
0.010* 
(0.001) 
-3.943* 
(1.502) 
3rd 
Head 
n=6.157 
0.021* 
(0.007) 
-2.775 
(2.515) 
0.010* 
(0.004) 
-6.725* 
(3.955) 
0.018* 
(0.005) 
-3.205 
(2.397) 
Partner  
n=6.236 
-0.0021* 
(0.0003) 
-5.393 
(9.757) 
0.0006 
(0.002) 
-2.907 
(10.354) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
-4.970 
(9.993) 
Child 
n=15.867 
0.0009 
(0.003) 
6.233 
(8.546) 
0.004* 
(0.001) 
-9.893* 
(4.622) 
0.006* 
(0.001) 
-5.876* 
(2.542) 
4th 
Head  
n=6.127 
-0.003 
(0.007) 
-5.7857 
(6.965) 
0.00217 
(0.004) 
-3.462 
(6.405) 
-0.0002 
(0.006) 
-6.587 
(7.889) 
Partner  
n= 6.218 
0.153 
(0.134) 
1.153 
(1.214) 
0.153 
(0.134) 
1.153 
(1.214) 
-0.0005 
(0.001) 
3.891 
(4.566) 
Child 
n=15.795 
-0.004* 
(0.001) 
4.108 
(6.264) 
-0.001* 
(0.0009) 
2.012 
(3.412) 
-0,0004 
(0.008) 
1.349 
(1.528) 
5th 
Head 
n=6.068 
-0.0004 
(0.003) 
1.419 
(1.512) 
0.003* 
(0.002) 
-1.362 
(1.356) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
-6.534 
(19.793) 
Partner 
n=6.199 
-0.0001 
(0.0001) 
-7.328 
(15.282) 
0.0008 
(0.001) 
-2.393 
(3.913) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-5.761 
(20.086) 
Child 
n=15.753 
0.0002 
(0.001) 
-7.842 
(25.625) 
0.0002 
(0.0008) 
2.163 
(8.319) 
0.0003 
(0.0008) 
-11.109 
(27.487) 
Source: Research results from National Employment and Unemployment Survey. Significance p≤0.1*. 
 
Analyzing the results with the change in the cutoff to five months, it can be observed that there was practically no 
change, which indicates that there is a lower probability of searching for employment among the heads of families and 
children, particularly up to the third benefit payment. From the fourth to the fifth payment, the probability of searching 
for employment among beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries did not show statistically significant differences. These 
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results indicate the presence of moral risk in the Unemployment Insurance Program, especially among the first three 
payments of the benefit. 
In order to deepen the analysis on the beneficiaries, the search for employment among the benefited workers was 
investigated. The analysis was performed using the length of stay in the last job, because according to the benefit 
regulations until 2014, if the worker proved to have worked between six months up to 11 months, he/she would be 
entitled to three payments, between 12 months and 23 months, he/she would be entitled to four payments, and if he/she 
could prove 24 months or more, that would correspond to five payments. The analysis in table 6 evaluates, at first, the 
effect of workers who stayed approximately 12 months or 360 days in the last job, given that if the worker stayed for 
less than 12 months, he/she was entitled to three payments, and four payments for those who worked more than 12 
months. In the second moment, the analysis was performed with the focus on the workers who were receiving between 
the fourth and fifth payment of the benefit, since the focal point of the analysis was 24 months or 720 days. Estimates 
were made based on the sharp regression discontinuity design. 
 
Table 6. Search for employment non-parametric regression  
Grade Position 
Cutoff (360 days) Cutoff (720 days) 
0.5 1.0 1.5 0.5 1.0 1.5 
Β β Β Β Β β 
1° 
Head 
 
0.040 
(0.109) 
-0.069 
(0.082) 
0.034 
(0.107) 
0.050 
(0.107) 
0.079 
(0.097) 
0.080 
(0.084) 
Partner 
 
0.451 
(0.273) 
0.330 
(0.210) 
0.250 
(0.186) 
0.041 
(0.104) 
0.042 
(0.106) 
0.042 
(0.105) 
Child 
-0.160* 
(0.069) 
-0.164* 
(0.072) 
-0.158* 
(0.068) 
0.171 
(0.159) 
0.038 
(0.060) 
0.076 
(0.076) 
2° 
Head 
 
-0.073 
(0.115) 
-0.054 
(0.106) 
0.087 
(0.146) 
-0.090 
(0.263) 
0.096 
(0.108) 
0.056 
(0.127) 
Partner 
 
0.809 
(0.465) 
0.294 
(0.251) 
0.283 
(0.210) 
0.156 
(0.203) 
0.154 
(0.203) 
0.195 
(0.220) 
Child 
-0.196* 
(0.098) 
-0.166* 
(0.082) 
-0.161* 
(0.081) 
0.470 
(0.383) 
0.275 
(0.169) 
0.256 
(0.149) 
3° 
Head 
 
-0.285* 
(0.115) 
-0.394* 
(0.125) 
-0.318* 
(0.118) 
-0.180 
(0.278) 
0.060 
(0.134) 
0.057 
(0.146) 
Partner 
 
0.396 
(0.332) 
0.352 
(0.311) 
0.314 
(0.282) 
0.176 
(0.247) 
0.162 
(0.233) 
0.197 
(0.270) 
Child 
 
-0.218* 
(0.123) 
-0,178* 
(0.079) 
-0,201* 
(0.116) 
0.529 
(0.474) 
0.357 
(0.250) 
0.261 
(0.176) 
Source: Research results from National Employment and Unemployment Survey. Significance p≤ 0.1*. 
 
Table 6 shows that the search for employment by beneficiaries was different, particularly among beneficiaries who stayed 
more than one year in their last job, compared to those who remained for less than one year. This result indicates that 
workers entitled to more than three payments showed a decreased search for employment, especially the children and the 
heads of families. Among the children, the values found for the probability of searching for employment were between 
-21.80% and -15.08%, whereas for the heads of families, the values were statistically different only when a third degree 
polynomial was used, leaving a difference of between -39.40% and -28.50%, which demonstrates reduced robustness. 
Thus, the results point to the existence of rule manipulation by workers to have access to the UIP, which in turn intensifies 
the increase in turnover of the Brazilian labor market and generates low incentives for investment in human capital by 
companies, as well as a significant increase in the number of benefits paid by social security. In addition, when entering 
the program, the workers who are heads of families and the children presented lower probabilities of searching for 
employment, particularly up to the third payment of the benefit, demonstrating the existence of moral hazard in the 
Brazilian UIP. 
5. Conclusions 
The purpose of this article was to examine the existence of rule manipulation and of moral hazard in the Brazilian UIP. 
The analysis of rule manipulation was based on the benefit’s eligibility rule, and the moral risk issue based on the search 
for employment by the workers. This paper contributes to the literature, especially about the influence of the program on 
the Brazilian labor market, which has been discussed but has not yet evaluated, as well as strengthening the fact of the 
presence of moral hazard. 
Concerning the results for rule manipulation, it was found that for the heads of family, the partners, and the children, there 
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is manipulation of the length of stay in the job, based on the minimum time necessary to access the UIP. This fact reveals 
that the Brazilian workers are influenced by the program as to the length of stay in the job. This means the benefit could be 
encouraging turnover in the Brazilian labor market, enhancing the low incentive for companies to invest in human capital 
and with this, generating the average low productivity of the national worker. Moreover, when analyzing the presence of 
moral hazard based on the search for employment between the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, there was an 
indication that there is a difference in the search for employment, especially between the heads of families and the 
children. When the analysis is restricted to the beneficiaries, the workers entitled to more than three payments showed a 
reduction in the search for employment, especially the children and the heads of families, compared to workers who were 
entitled to just three payments. Among the children, the values for the probability of searching for employment were 
between -21.80% and -15.08%, while for the heads of families the values were statistically different only when a 
third-degree polynomial was used, leaving the difference between -39.40% and 28.50%, corroborating with the results 
stated by authors such as Gerard and Gonzaga (2012) and Teixeira and Balbinotto Neto (2013). 
Therefore, with these results, a reformulation of the Brazilian UIP is suggested in order to minimize the interference of the 
program with the national labor market, organized in such a way as to encourage a greater length of stay for workers in 
their jobs, which will motivate companies to invest in training and professional qualifications of their employees. In 
addition, the program with greater inclusion restrictions should offer vocational training vacancies to workers who indeed 
need retraining or even training. This in turn would facilitate monitoring and assist in employability and will impact the 
increase in the reinsertion wage for Brazilian beneficiaries and the efficient allocation of the resources coming from the 
workers themselves to the Workers Assistance Fund. 
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Notes 
                                                        
Note i: An application of the McCrary test for Brazil can be found in Firpo et. al. (2014). 
Note ii: According to Barros, Corseuil and Foguel (2000), for the employed worker, unemployment insurance represents a 
subsidy to the search for a better employment to which access should be given only when dismissed without just cause. 
In this sense, unemployment insurance encourages the induced dismissal, especially during periods of economic 
recovery. As a result, this reduction in the length of an employment relationship has negative impacts on investments in 
specific human capital, productivity and wage level. 
Note iii: In Schmieder et al. (2012), the authors replicated their results using the impact of the program only on the 
workers aged 42 and found a result of 0.20 months. 
Note iv: For an introduction to the conventional technique of local polynomials, see Fan and Gijbel (1996). 
Note v: As suggested by Gelman and Imbens (2014), polynomials were used in the estimations up to a maximum of three 
degrees, but due to space limitations the results had to be suppressed from the analysis, however the results remained 
stable. 
Note vi: In addition to the 5-month analysis, the results were also tested for 7 and 9 months of stay in the last job, and 
the results were similar, but due to space limitations, the results were not presented. 
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